This paper explores some aspects of computer architecture that might cast doubt on the possibility of digital consciousness.

This paper argues that given the possibility of non-deterministic effects, most routine actions do not radically alter the shape of the future.

We argue that conservationist organizations should make institutional changes to better promote the welfare of individual animals.

This paper argues that interactionists about consciousness have difficulty explaining how minds influence neurons to produce behavior.

This paper argues that moral attitudes are distinguished by their functional properties in a restricted range of contexts.

This paper reflects on the significance of Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence for the long-term future of the human species.

This paper argues for the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect.

This paper discusses how noncognitivists might extend their accounts of moral judgments to other kinds of moral attitudes, such as moral hopes and moral intuitions.

This paper suggests that metaethical expressivists should be unbothered by a large number of brute norms and hence that they should be free to postulate their way out of Unwin's negation problem.